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"AT LEAST, TO DO NO HARM"*: DOES THE SECOND
RESTATEMENT OF CONFLICTS MEET THE
HIPPOCRATIC STANDARD?
RUSSELL J. WEINTRAUB**
INTRODUCTION
Professor Willis Reese, the Reporter for the Restatement (Second) of
Conflict of Laws,1 acknowledged that the work was "written during [a]
time of turmoil"2 in the subject. Work on the Restatement (Second) was
started in 1951,' twelve years before the first United States court aban-
doned the "place-of-wrong" rule for choosing law in torts,4 and com-
pleted in 1969, 5 after sixteen states,6 the District of Columbia,7 and
* HIPPOCRATES, EPIDEMICS, bk. 1, ch. 11 (quoted in JOHN BARTLETr, FAMILIAR
QUOTATIONS 71 (Justin Kaplan ed., 16th ed. 1992) ("As to diseases make a habit of two
things-to help, or at least, to do no harm.")). Sometimes this injunction is stated in Latin
as "primum non nocerd' and translated as "above all, do no harm." See Richard Lowell
Nygaard, Is Prison an Appropriate Response to Crime?, 40 ST. Louis U. L.J. 677, 697 (1996).
** Professor of Law and holder of the John B. Connally Chair in Civil Jurisprudence,
University of Texas School of Law. B.A., New York University; J.D., Harvard University. I
thank Jennifer Harris, my research assistant, for her editorial comments.
1. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS (1971).
2. Willis L.M. Reese, Foreword, 72 COLUM. L. Rv. 219, 219 (1972).
3. See id.
4. See Babcock v. Jackson, 191 N.E.2d 279, 285 (N.Y. 1963).
5. The Restatement (Second) was adopted and promulgated by the American Law Insti-
tute in 1969 and published in 1971. For current Bluebook purposes, see THE BLUEBOOK: A
UNIFORM SYSTEM OF CITATION 84 (16th ed. 1996), the citation date is the date of publica-
tion, although in the prior edition, it was the date of adoption. See THE BLUEBOOK: A
UNIFORM SYSTEM OF CITATION 83 (15th ed. 1991). This change is not an improvement. In
the case of the Conflicts Restatement, the two-year difference between promulgation and
publication is significant, and the current rule is misleading.
6. See Armstrong v. Armstrong, 441 P.2d 699, 703 (Alaska 1968) (using matrimonial
domicile instead of the place-of-wrong rule in determination of interspousal immunity);
Schwartz v. Schwartz, 447 P.2d 254, 255 (Ariz. 1968) (abrogating the lex loci delicti rule in an
interspousal tort immunity case); Reich v. Purcell, 432 P.2d 727, 730 (Cal. 1967) (en banc)
(stating that the law of the place of the wrong is not necessarily applicable in all tort ac-
tions); Wartell v. Formusa, 213 N.E.2d 544, 545 (Ill. 1966) (stating that the law of the state
where the alleged tortious act took place does not necessarily govern the determination of
the issue); Fabricius v. Horgen, 132 N.W.2d 410, 415 (Iowa 1965) (recognizing "the most
significant relationship with the occurrence and parties and important contacts as more
properly controlling than 'wooden application' . . . of the strict lex loci delicti rule");
Wessling v. Paris, 417 S.W.2d 259, 261 (Ky. 1967) (applying the law of the jurisdiction with
all interests except "the tortuitous place of the accident"); Kopp v. Rechtzigel, 141 N.W.2d
526, 528 (Minn. 1966) (applying the law of domicile of the parties instead of the law of
jurisdiction where the tort occurred); Mitchell v. Craft, 211 So. 2d 509, 516 (Miss. 1968)
(applying the law of the jurisdiction that had the most substantial relationship to the par-
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Puerto Rico' had adopted new tort choice-of-law rules. As the Restate-
ment (Second) progressed, it was apparent that a "conflicts revolution"9
was sweeping the land. The attempt to "restate" law that was in the
process of rapid change triggered suggestions to abandon the pro-
ject1 ° and criticisms of drafts as insufficiently reflecting the theoretical
bases for the changes that were occurring in the courts."
Professor Reese responded to these suggestions and criticisms by
adopting the goal of doing no harm:
In these circumstances, one obvious goal of the Restate-
ment Second must be not to mislead. Care must be taken not
to state rules that will prove wrong when applied to new
problems, for if this were to be done with any frequency the
ties rather than the law of the jurisdiction where the accident occurred); Kennedy v.
Dixon, 439 S.W.2d 173, 184 (Mo. 1969) (en banc) (abandoning the lex loci delicti rule);
Thompson v. Thompson, 193 A.2d 439, 441 (N.H. 1963) (stating that the law of thejuris-
diction where a tort is committed controls the applicable standard of care, but does not
control the issue of whether plaintiff may maintain an action); Mellk v. Sarahson, 229 A.2d
625, 626 (N.J. 1967) (stating that the lex loci delicti rule should not be applied mechani-
cally); Babcock, 191 N.E.2d at 285 (stating that the law of the jurisdiction with the strongest
interest in the resolution of the issues presented should apply); Casey v. Manson Constr. &
Eng'g Co., 428 P.2d 898, 904-05 (Or. 1967) (en banc) (adopting "for tort actions the rule
of most significant relationship with the occurrence and with the parties"); Griffith v.
United Air Lines, Inc., 203 A.2d 796, 805 (Pa. 1964) (abandoning the lex loci delicti rule);
Woodward v. Stewart, 243 A.2d 917, 923 (R.I. 1968) (adopting an interest-weighing ap-
proach instead of the lex loci delicti rule); Wilcox v. Wilcox, 133 N.W.2d 408, 416 (Wis.
1965) ("putting aside the common law of lex loci" in favor of a significant-relationship
analysis).
7. See Williams v. Rawlings Truck Line, Inc., 357 F.2d 581, 585-86 (D.C. Cir. 1965)
(applying the law of the jurisdiction with the greatest interest in the controversy).
8. See Widow of Fornaris v. American Sur. Co., 93 P.R.R. 28, 46 (1966) (abandoning
the lex loci delicti rule and adopting the doctrine of dominant contacts).
9. Alfred Hill, Choice of Law and Jurisdiction in the Supreme Court, 81 COLUM. L. REV. 960,
990 (1981) (referring to "those in the vanguard of the current conflicts revolution in the
United States"); see also Russell J. Weintraub, Revolution in the Choice of Law for Torts, 51
A.B.A.J. 441, 441 (1965) ("In the past few years the tempo of change has quickened until
the situation can best be described as a revolution in the choice of law for torts.").
10. See, e.g., Albert A. Ehrenzweig, The Second Conflicts Restatement: A Last Appeal for Its
Withdrawal, 113 U. PA. L. REv. 1230, 1231-32 (1965) (stating that the Council of the Ameri-
can Law Institute had rejected his appeal for the appointment of a special commission to
reexamine the drafts of the Restatement (Second) to determine whether a restatement of the
subject is now desirable and if so, how the current drafts could be improved).
11. See, e.g., David F. Cavers, Re-Restating the Conflict of Laws: The Chapter on Contracts, in
XXTH CENTURY COMPARATIVE AND CONFLIcrS LAW 349-50 (Kurt H. Nadelmann et al. eds.,
1961) (stating that he finds the work to date "impaired by... 'jurisdiction-selecting rules'
... which make a state the object of the choice without regard to the content of the law that
is thereby chosen or its effect on the issue before the forum"); Russell J. Weintraub, The
Contracts Proposals of the Second Restatement of Conflict of Laws-A Critique, 46 IowA L. REV.
713, 724 (1961) ("[B]eneath the surface, this 'most significant relationship' rule [in a draft
of what became § 188], like the 'center of gravity' rule on which it seems to be based,
becomes a contact-counting rather than a contact-evaluating rule.").
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Restatement would prove to be a hindrance, rather than an
aid, in the further development of the subject. Hence, as a
general proposition, it is probably better to err on the side of
a rule that may be too fluid and uncertain in application
than to take one's chances with a precise and hard-and-fast
rule that may be proved wrong in the future. 1
2
Nevertheless, six sentences later, Professor Reese states that "the Re-
statement Second should state precise and definite rules in those few
areas where this can be done.""
The tension between these two statements is apparent. How can
there be a statement of "precise and definite rules" in a subject that is
quickly changing? The attempt to do so makes the unwarranted as-
sumption that the intellectual bases for the changes already observa-
ble will not in time require changes in all areas, even those that are as
yet unaffected.
The theoretical engine driving the changes in conflicts rules was
the proposition that courts should not choose law by territorial locat-
ing factors, such as place of wrong for torts, 14 or place of making for
contracts.1 5 Professor Cavers referred to this method of choosing law
as "engaging in a blindfold test"1" because it selected law without re-
gard to its content. The heart of the "new"1 7 conflicts thinking was
that courts should instead choose law in the light of its content and
purposes in such a manner as to permit maximum accommodation of
the policies of the various states that have contacts with the parties
and the transaction.1 8
This Article examines whether in fact the Restatement (Second), as
Professor Reese intended, did no harm. Over the twenty-five years
since its publication, has the Restatement (Second) assisted and guided
courts and lawyers, or impeded them? In large measure the answer to
12. Willis L.M. Reese, Conflict of Laws and the Restatement Second, 28 LAw & CONTEMP.
PROBS. 679, 681 (1963).
13. Id.
14. See RESTATEMENT OF CONFLICT OF LAws § 378 (1934) ("The law of the place of
wrong determines whether a person has sustained a legal injury.").
15. See id. § 332 ("The law of the place of contracting determines the validity and effect
of a promise.").
16. David F. Cavers, A Critique of the Choice-of-Law Problem, 47 HARV. L. REv. 173, 180
(1933).
17. Cavers, see id., indicates that the thinking was not so new. In the realm of ideas, the
perception that something is new is likely to result from an ignorance of history. The
concept that the content and purposes of a rule should determine its territorial reach has
been traced back at least as far as the writing of Guy de Coquille in the sixteenth century.
See Friedrich K. Juenger, A Page of Histoy, 35 MERCER L. REv. 419, 432-33 (1984).
18. See RUSSELLJ. WEINTRAUB, COMMENTARY ON THE CONFLICT OF LAws 281-91 (3d ed.
1986).
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this question depends on the extent to which the Restatement (Second)'s
provisions are consistent with the central concepts driving the
changes in choice of law. Part I of this Article focuses on the rules for
choice of law in tort and contract that are the heart of the Restatement
(Second). Part II examines some of the "precise and definite rules"
that Professor Reese was confident could be stated despite the turmoil
in the field.19 It should come as no surprise that it is here that the
Restatement (Second) has caused the most difficulty. Part III appraises
some of the positive accomplishments and strengths of the Restatement
(Second).
Examining the impact of the Restatement (Second) is not an idle
enterprise, for the Restatement (Second) has had a profound effect on
the courts over the past quarter century. The latest survey of the field
by Professor Symeon Symeonides lists twenty-one states as using the
Restatement (Second) in tort cases and twenty-five as using the Restate-
ment (Second) in contract cases,2" but cautions against the assumption
that all the states listed are equally committed to following the Restate-
ment (Second)." Some states use the Restatement (Second) first to reject
rigid territorial rules and then reshape it to facilitate the process of
selecting law on the basis of content and policies.22
None of this should be construed as a criticism of Professor
Reese, a great scholar who directed the work with intelligence and
industry. Every restatement is a product of many hands-the re-
porter, the advisers, the Council of the American Law Institute, and
the members of the Institute commenting, moving amendments, and
voting on the floor of the annual meeting. It is unlikely that any re-
statement will emerge as the coherent expression of a single scholar's
insights, and the Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws" certainly did
not.
19. See supra note 13 and accompanying text.
20. See Symeon C. Symeonides, The Judicial Acceptance of the Second Conflicts Restatement:
A Mixed Blessing, 56 MD. L. REv. 1248, 1265-66 (1997).
21. See id. at 1265; see also Travelers Indem. Co. v. Lake, 594 A.2d 38, 47 (Del. 1991)
(stating that the court "need not dwell on the efficacy" of governmental interest analysis,
Professor Leflar's choice-influencing considerations, and the most-significant-relationship
approach of the Restatement (Second) because the Restatement (Second) "'includes most of the
substance of all the modem thinking on choice of law'" (quoting Gutierrez v. Collins, 583
S.W.2d 312, 318 (Tex. 1979) (quoting ROBERT A. LEFLAR, AMERICAN CONFLIcrs LAw § 139
(1977)))); Robert A. Sedler, Continuity, Precedent, and Choice of Law: A Reflective Response to
Professor Hil4 38 WAYNE L. REV. 1419, 1427 (1992) ("[I]n practice, all the courts that have
abandoned the traditional approach to choice of law generally employ interest analysis
regardless of which 'modem' approach to choice of law they are purportedly following.").
22. See infra Part III.A.
23. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAws (1971).
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I. THE TORT AND CONTRACT RuLEs OF THE PESTATEMENT (SECOND)
A. Tort
The problem with the basic tort provisions of the Restatement (Sec-
ond), sections 14524 and 146,25 is an inconsistent mixing of territorial
determinism with references to the policies underlying conflicting
laws. Section 145(2) lists four territorial contacts that are "to be taken
into account," and comment (e) states that "[w]hen the injury oc-
curred in a single, clearly ascertainable state and when the conduct
which caused the injury also occurred there, that state will usually be
the state of the applicable law with respect to most issues involving the
tort."'26 Section 146 creates a presumption that the law of the place of
injury applies to actions for personal injuries and repeats with even
more emphasis the statement that, when conduct and injury occur in
the same state, "the local law of this state will usually be applied to
determine most issues involving the tort."27 A comment then provides
an example of a situation in which the law of the place of conduct and
injury will not apply.28 The comment discusses the hypothetical case
of an airplane flying between two points in the same state. The air-
plane's flight path takes it "for a short distance"29 over another state
24. Section 145 provides:
The General Principle
(1) The rights and liabilities of the parties with respect to an issue in tort are
determined by the local law of the state which, with respect to that issue, has the
most significant relationship to the occurrence and the parties under the princi-
ples stated in § 6.
(2) Contacts to be taken into account in applying the principles of § 6 to deter-
mine the law applicable to an issue include:
(a) the place where the injury occurred,
(b) the place where the conduct causing the injury occurred,
(c) the domicil, residence, nationality, place of incorporation and place of
business of the parties, and
(d) the place where the relationship, if any, between the parties is centered.
These contacts are to be evaluated according to their relative importance with
respect to the particular issue.
Id. § 145.
25. Section 146 provides:
Personal Injuries
In an action for a personal injury, the local law of the state where the injury
occurred determines the rights and liabilities of the parties, unless, with respect
to the particular issue, some other state has a more significant relationship under
the principles stated in § 6 to the occurrence and the parties, in which event the
local law of the other state will be applied.
Id. § 146.
26. Id. § 145 cmt. e.
27. Id. § 146 cmt. d.
28. Id.
29. Id.
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where the pilot's negligence causes a passenger to suffer "severe fright
and shock."3 All other contacts, the domicile of the plaintiff, the
purchase of the ticket, the principal place of business of the airline,
are in the state where the flight began and ended.31 The comment
then concludes that the state with all of these contacts "may therefore
be the state of most significant relationship and, if so, it will be the
state of the applicable law with respect to issues that would usually be
determined by the local law of the state of conduct and injury. 3 2
These statements imply that, if the defendant's conduct and
plaintiff's injury are in the same state, that state's law applies except in
truly extraordinary circumstances. Nothing could be more inconsis-
tent with choosing law based on the law's content and purpose. All of
the landmark cases departing from the place-of-wrong rule and de-
cided before the Restatement (Second) was promulgated are cases in
which the law of the place of both conduct and injury was not ap-
plied.33 Most of these cases involved anachronistic laws of the place of
injury that denied or reduced recovery, such as interspousal immu-
nity, statutory limits on wrongful death damages, and guest statutes.
Courts rejected these laws not because, as in the hypothetical case in
section 146, the place of conduct and injury had some transitory con-
tact with the parties, but because other states would experience the
consequences of choosing law and the place of injury would not.
In the light of the territorial bias of sections 145 and 146, it is not
surprising that many courts applying these sections "have merely
counted contacts rather than engaging in an analysis of the interests
and policies listed in the Restatement." 4 In the year of the silver anni-
versary of the Restatement (Second)'s publication, in two different cases,
an Eighth Circuit judge recited exactly the same territorial formula,
focusing on the fact that conduct and injury occurred in the same
state.35 Both opinions chose law before adverting to the content of
the law chosen and never inquired whether any other state with a con-
tact with the parties or the transaction had a different law.36
Alongside its territorial provisions, the Restatement (Second) con-
tains indications that the content and purpose of law is of paramount
30. Id.
31. Id.
32. Id.
33. See supra notes 6-8 and accompanying text.
34. Hataway v. McKinley, 830 S.W.2d 53, 58 (Tenn. 1992) (citing Gregory E. Smith,
Choice of Law in the United States, 38 HASTINGS L.J. 1041, 1046 (1987)).
35. See Scheerer v. Hardee's Food Sys., Inc., 92 F.3d 702, 708 (8th Cir. 1996) (McMil-
lian, J.); Horn v. B.A.S.S., 92 F.3d 609, 611 (8th Cir. 1996) (McMillian, J.).
36. See Scheerer, 92 F.3d at 708; Horn, 92 F.3d at 611.
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importance in choice-of-law decisions. The black letter of both sec-
tions 145 and 146 refers to "the principles stated in § 6."'s Section 6
in turn lists as "factors relevant to the choice of the applicable rule of
law... the relevant policies of the forum... the relevant policies of
other interested states.., the basic policies underlying the particular
field of law." 8 Moreover, immediately after section 145(2)'s listing of
territorial "[c]ontacts to be taken into account," the section cautions
that "[t]hese contacts are to be evaluated according to their relative
importance with respect to the particular issue." 9
In a field changing as rapidly as the conflict of laws, these mixed
signals caused predictable confusion. The unmistakable mandate
should have been to stop sticking pins in maps and start paying atten-
,tion to the content of the law chosen.
B. Contract
The major Restatement (Second) sections for choice of law in con-
tract actions are sections 18740 and 188.41 Section 187 gives the par-
37. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS §§ 145(1), 146 (1971).
38. Id. § 6(2)(b), (c), (e).
39. Id. § 145(2).
40. Section 187 provides:
Law of the State Chosen by the Parties
(1) The law of the state chosen by the parties to govern their contractual rights
and duties will be applied if the particular issue is one which the parties could
have resolved by an explicit provision in their agreement directed to that issue.
(2) The law of the state chosen by the parties to govern their contractual rights
and duties will be applied, even if the particular issue is one which the parties
could not have resolved by an explicit provision in their agreement directed to
that issue, unless either
(a) the chosen state has no substantial relationship to the parties or the
transaction and there is no other reasonable basis for the parties' choice, or
(b) application of the law of the chosen state would be contrary to a funda-
mental policy of a state which has a materially greater interest than the chosen
state in the determination of the particular issue and which, under the rule of
§ 188, would be the state of the applicable law in the absence of an effective
choice of law by the parties.
(3) In the absence of a contrary indication of intention, the reference is to the
local law of the state of the chosen law.
Id. § 187.
41. Section 188 provides:
Law Governing in Absence of Effective Choice by the Parties
(1) The rights and duties of the parties with respect to an issue in contract are
determined by the local law of the state which, with respect to that issue, has the
most significant relationship to the transaction and the parties under the princi-
ples stated in § 6.
(2) In the absence of an effective choice of law by the parties (see § 187), the
contacts to be taken into account in applying the principles of § 6 to determine
the law applicable to an issue include:
1290
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ties limited power to choose the applicable law, and in the absence of
such a choice, section 188 again42 gives mixed territorial and content-
based signals.
1. Party Autonomy.--Section 187 sensibly gives the parties to a
contract unlimited power to select law to govern matters of construc-
tion of the contract, but also erects a maze for them to traverse should
they choose law to govern validity.4" The reason that unlimited power
to control the law applicable to construction is desirable is that in this
context the choice-of-law clause is simply a device to incorporate by
reference what the parties would be free to spell out at length." Em-
powering parties to choose law to govern validity is more controver-
sial, but section 187, depending on one's view of such matters, gives
either too little or too much freedom.
The view of other countries and of most commentators is that
section 187 is too restrictive, that the parties should be free to select
any law to govern validity, even the law of a jurisdiction that has no
contact with the parties or the transaction. 45 At the other extreme are
a few holdouts who take the position that the parties should not have
the power to choose law to govern validity. Instead, courts should ap-
(a) the place of contracting,
(b) the place of negotiation of the contract,
(c) the place of performance,
(d) the location of the subject matter of the contract, and
(e) the domicil, residence, nationality, place of incorporation and place of
business of the parties.
These contacts are to be evaluated according to their relative importance with
respect to the particular issue.
(3) If the place of negotiating the contract and the place of performance are in
the same state, the local law of this state will usually be applied, except as other-
wise provided in §§ 189-199 and 203.
Id. § 188.
42. See supra Part IA.
43. See supra note 40.
44. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFUCT OF LAws § 187 cmt. c (1971).
45. See ANDREAS F. LOWENFELD, INTERNATIONAL LITIGATION AND THE QUEST FOR REASON-
ABLENESS: ESSAYS IN PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAw 202 (1996) ("Only in the United States,
among the countries surveyed in this volume, is it still said that [for issues of validity] the
state of the law chosen must have a substantial relationship to the parties or the transac-
tion."); Friedrich K. Juenger, The Inter-American Convention on the Law Applicable to Interna-
tional Contracts: Some Highlights and Comparisons, 42 AM. J. COMP. L. 381, 388 (1994)
(quoting with approval a Convention provision giving the parties freedom to choose any
law to govern validity); see also U.C.C. § 4A-507(b) (1995) (stating that the parties to a wire
funds transfer may choose law to govern their rights and obligations "whether or not the
payment order or the funds transfer bears a reasonable relation to that jurisdiction"); id,
§ 5-116(a) (stating that the law chosen to govern the liability of an obligor under a letter of
credit "need not bear any relation to the transaction").
1997] 1291
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ply the law that validates, subject to whatever limitations one would
otherwise place on party autonomy.4 6 A rule of validation would
achieve the same objectives of certainty and predictability as party
autonomy.
Instead of either absolute autonomy or no power to choose law
for validity, the Restatement (Second) provides a middle road impeded
by two major obstacles. The law chosen for validity must have a sub-
stantial relationship to the parties or the transaction, or there must be
some other reasonable basis for choosing that law.47 In addition, the
law chosen must not be "contrary to a fundamental policy of a state"
that "has a materially greater interest than the chosen state" in deter-
mining validity, if the state with the greater interest has the most sig-
nificant relationship to the parties and the transaction.48 We are not
told what "fundamental policy" means except that it must be "substan-
tial" but "need not be as strong as would be required to justify the
forum in refusing to entertain suit upon a foreign cause of action" on
the ground that it is against public policy.49 The statement that "[a] n
important consideration is the extent to which the significant contacts
are grouped in this state"" is a territorial red herring that further
fouls the scent of what is "fundamental."
No wonder that courts have trouble applying section 187 in a sen-
sible manner. DeSantis v. Wackenhut Corp.51 is an example of a good
court52 lost in the maze of section 187. DeSantis worked in North
Carolina, providing corporate security services to RJ. Reynolds Indus-
tries.53 Wackenhut recruited him to manage its office in Houston,
Texas. 54 The employment negotiations took place at Wackenhut's
Florida headquarters. 55 At the inception of his employment in Hous-
ton, DeSantis signed a noncompetition agreement that included a
clause choosing Florida law to govern its validity.56 The Houston of-
fice provided security guards to businesses in at least thirteen Texas
46. See WEINTRAUB, supra note 18, at 371-75.
47. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 187(2) (a) (1971).
48. Id. § 187(2)(b).
49. Id. § 187 cmt. g.
50. Id.
51. 793 S.W.2d 670 (Tex. 1990).
52. The court had previously chosen law with careful attention to the content and poli-
cies of the conflicting rules. See Duncan v. Cessna Aircraft Co., 665 S.W.2d 414 (Tex. 1984),
discussed infra at text accompanying notes 188-218.
53. DeSantis, 793 S.W.2d at 675.
54. Id.
55. Id.
56. Id.
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counties. DeSantis managed the Houston office for nearly three
years and then resigned.5" He formed a competing company and
solicited business from Wackenhut's clients.5 9 One Wackenhut cus-
tomer signed a contract with DeSantis, and another contemplated do-
ing so.6" Wackenhut sued DeSantis and his company in Texas to
enjoin them from violating the noncompetition agreement and to re-
cover damages for breach.6 1 The trial court granted the injunction,
and the intermediate appellate court affirmed,6 2 but the Supreme
Court of Texas reversed.63
The Supreme Court of Texas, without first determining whether
the noncompetition agreement was enforceable under Texas law,
held that the choice-of-law clause would not be enforced because,
under Restatement (Second) section 188(1), Texas "'has the most signifi-
cant relationship to the transaction and the parties"'; 6 4 "Texas has a
materially greater interest than does Florida in determining whether
the noncompetition agreement in this case is enforceable";6 5 and "the
law governing enforcement of noncompetition agreements is funda-
mental policy in Texas."6 6 Only then did the court "consider whether
the noncompetition agreement between DeSantis and Wackenhut
[was] enforceable under Texas law.",6 7 The court concluded, in a
rather unconvincing fashion, that the agreement was not enforcea-
ble. 68 The only reference in the opinion to Florida law is that "DeSan-
tis appears to concede that the agreement was enforceable under
Florida law."6 9
The Supreme Court of Texas thus first selects law by putting a pin
in the map without regard to the content or purposes of Florida and
Texas law. It is unlikely that a Florida court would agree that "Texas
57. Id. at 676.
58. Id. at 675.
59. Id.
60. Id. at 675-76.
61. Id. at 676.
62. Id. at 676-77.
63. Id. at 689.
64. Id. at 678 (quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICr OF LAWS § 188(1) (1971)).
65. Id. at 679.
66. Id. at 681.
67. Id
68. Id. at 681-84. The court found insufficient evidence that DeSantis was able to ap-
propriate good will he had developed with customers while working for Wackenhut. Id. at
683-84. Moreover, Wackenhut had not demonstrated a need to protect confidential infor-
mation because DeSantis could have learned of Wackenhut's customers and their needs
without working for Wackenhut. Id. at 684. Finally, was there no showing that Wacken-
hut's pricing and bidding strategies were unique. Id. at 683-84.
69. Id. at 680 n.5.
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has a materially greater interest than does Florida in determining
whether the noncompetition agreement . . . is enforceable."7 ° As a
result of the decision, Texas law firms had difficulty writing "opinion
letters" assuring parties to interstate and international transactions
that a Texas court would enforce choice-of-law clauses or uphold the
agreements under foreign law.7' A committee of the Business Law
Section of the State Bar of Texas drafted a statute providing that, in
transactions worth a million dollars or more, the parties could choose
the law of any reasonably connected jurisdiction to govern validity and
a Texas court could not use fundamental or public policy to refuse to
enforce the choice-of-law clause.7 2 The draft was enacted.7" Thus, a
judicial decision purporting to follow the Restatement (Second), but lack-
ing cogency, affected vital commercial interests and resulted in legisla-
tive overkill.
In addition to determining what limits to impose, another prob-
lem with permitting parties to choose law to govern validity is that
frequently the contract will select law that invalidates. The Restatement
(Second) sensibly provides that when this occurs the choice should be
regarded as a mistake and the law should be chosen under the "most-
significant-relationship" test.74 Many courts, however, have taken the
parties at their word and applied the invalidating law. 5 For example,
in Peugeot Motors of America, Inc. v. Eastern Auto Distributors,76 the
United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit validated the
nonrenewal provisions of a distributorship contract. In order to do
so, however, the court had to avoid applying New York's Franchise
Motor Vehicle Dealer Act, although the distributorship agreement
chose New York law.77 The court accomplished its feat by holding
that the New York franchise law did not apply because the dealer was
not doing business in New York and that under New York common
law, which therefore applied, the nonrenewal provision of the agree-
70. Id, at 679.
71. See MAURICE ROSENBERG ET AL., CONFLICT OF LAWS 594 (10th ed. 1996).
72. See id.
73. See TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 35.51 (a), (b) (West Supp. 1977).
74. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 187 cmt. e (1971) (referring to the
test of § 188).
75. See WEINTRAUB, supra note 18, at 371 n.30 (citing cases in which law chosen by
contracting party is invalidating but is applied by the court); see also Punzi v. Shaker Adver.
Agency, Inc., 601 So. 2d 599, 600 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1992) (applying chosen law to invali-
date noncompetition agreement); Connecticut Nat'l Bank v. Kommit, 577 N.E.2d 639, 641
(Mass. App. 1991) (applying law chosen in credit card agreement to invalidate gambling
debt if it can be shown on remand that creditor should have known of nature of debt).
76. 892 F.2d 355 (4th Cir. 1989).
77. Id. at 357-58.
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ment was valid.7' Thus, the court used renvoi,79 looking to the whole
law of New York, including the territorial limits in its franchise law,80
to avoid reaching the result that the courts of the chosen state would
have reached in a purely domestic case. The Restatement (Second), how-
ever, abjures renvoi in this context, stating that " [i] n the absence of a
contrary indication of intention, the [parties'] reference is to the local
law of the state of the chosen law."81
Choice-of-law clauses in arbitration agreements are particularly
likely to trigger unintended consequences. If the law of the chosen
state limits the powers of arbitrators or the scope of arbitration, dis-
pute settlement is likely to take a prolonged detour to litigate the in-
teraction of the parties' agreement to arbitrate, their choice-of-law
clause, and the arbitration law of the chosen state. For example, in
Mastrobuono v. Shearson Lehman Hutton, Inc.,s2 clients of a securities
dealer had signed an agreement proffered by the dealer that submit-
ted all disputes to arbitration "in accordance with the rules of the Na-
tional Association of Securities Dealers (NASD)""5 and had chosen
New York law to govern.84 NASD rules permitted arbitrators to assess
punitive damages, but under New York law only courts could do so.5
It took a trip up to the Supreme Court of the United States to decide
whether the arbitrators' award of punitive damages was foreclosed by
the agreement. The Court upheld the award on the ground that the
choice-of-law clause "might include only New York's substantive rights
and obligations, and not the State's allocation of power between alter-
native tribunals."8 6 The Court also invoked "the common-law rule ...
that a court should construe ambiguous language against the interest
of the party that drafted it."
8 7
Six years to the day before Mastrobuono, the Supreme Court had
decided Volt Information Sciences, Inc. v. Board of Trustees.8" In Volt,
Stanford University had entered into a construction contract with
Volt.8 9 The contract contained a provision agreeing to arbitrate all
disputes and a clause choosing "the law of the place where the Project
78. Id. at 358.
79. See infra Part III.B. for a discussion of renvoi and the Restatement (Second).
80. Peugeot Motors, 892 F.2d at 358.
81. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CoNFLicT OF LAWS § 187(3) (1971).
82. 514 U.S. 52 (1995).
83. Id. at 59.
84. Id.
85. Id.
86. Id, at 60.
87. Id- at 62.
88. 489 U.S. 468 (1989).
89. Id. at 470.
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is located,"9 which was California. Volt demanded arbitration of a
dispute, and Stanford responded by suing Volt for fraud and breach
of contract.9' Stanford also sought indemnity from two other compa-
nies with whom it did not have arbitration agreements.9 2 California
law permitted a court to stay arbitration in a case of this kind involving
parties to an arbitration agreement and other litigants who have not
agreed to arbitrate.93 The California courts interpreted the arbitra-
tion agreement to include the California rule on staying arbitration
and denied Volt's motion to compel arbitration.94 The Supreme
Court affirmed.95
In Mastrobuono, the Court distinguished Volt on the basis of a dif-
ferent interpretation of the interaction between the arbitration and
choice-of-law clauses.96 The Mastrobuono opinion pointed out that in
Volt the Supreme Court deferred to an interpretation of the agree-
ment by a California state court, while in Mastrobuono the Court was
reviewing a federal court's interpretation, "and our interpretation ac-
cords with that of the only decision-maker arguably entitled to defer-
ence-the arbitrator."97 Justice Thomas dissented in Mastrobuono on
the ground that "the choice-of-law provision here cannot reasonably
be distinguished from the one in Volt."9
To add to the confusion, under New York law, whether a claim is
barred by passage of time is an issue for the courts, not arbitrators.99
The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit has held
that, if an agreement contains both an arbitration clause and a clause
choosing New York law, the issue of timeliness is for the arbitrators.100
The Second Circuit has also held that a recent contrary opinion from
the New York Court of Appeals 1 was not persuasive because it relied
on the Seventh Circuit's decision in Mastrobuono,'0 2 which was re-
90. Id.
91. Id. at 470-71.
92. Id. at 471.
93. Id.
94. Id. at 471-73.
95. Id. at 473.
96. Mastrobuono v. Shearson Lehman Hutton, Inc., 514 U.S. 52, 58 (1995) ("[1]f con-
tracting parties agree to include claims for punitive damages . . .their agreement will be
enforced according to its terms.").
97. Id. at 60.
98. Id. at 64 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
99. See In re Smith Barney, Harris Upham & Co. v. Luckie, 647 N.E.2d 1308, 1313 (N.Y.
1995).
100. See PaineWebber, Inc. v. Bybyk, 81 F.3d 1193, 1196 (2d Cir. 1996).
101. See Luckie, 647 N.E.2d at 1308.
102. Mastrobuono v. Shearson Lehman Hutton, Inc., 20 F.3d 713 (7th Cir. 1994), rev'd,
514 U.S. 52 (1995).
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versed by the United States Supreme Court."°3 The Second Circuit
made its decision despite Mastrobuono's distinction of Volt on the
ground that in Volt the Supreme Court had deferred to a state court's
interpretation of the agreement.
10 4
Incidentally, Mastrobuono is contrary to the Restatement (Second).
Section 218 provides that the rights created by an arbitration agree-
ment are governed by the law selected by the parties under section
187,05 and this includes "the powers and duties of the arbitrators. '106
Mastrobuono does not cite section 218.
Thus, by giving the parties power to choose law to determine va-
lidity, but then placing cryptic limits on this power, the Restatement
(Second) raises as many questions as it purports to answer. If parties
are to have limited autonomy, they would be better served by a rule
that validates under any law the parties might have chosen, subject to
the same limitations that a court or legislature would place on the
parties' power to choose. Professor Reese rejected a rule of validation
on the ground that a state might have a strong interest in invalidating
contracts it considers "socially undesirable."'0 7 Professor Reese's rea-
son is not convincing. A rule of validation can except contracts violat-
ing important forum policies, just as section 187 contains this
exception to party autonomy.1 08 Professor Reese further contends
that "[a] rule of validation would ... be impossible to apply in the...
situation where a party claims that he has been relieved of his contrac-
tual obligation through the operation of a particular provision in the
contract [because] if the court validates the provision it must perforce
103. See Bybyk, 81 F.3d at 1200.
104. See supra note 97 and accompanying text.
105. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLIT OF LAWS § 218 (1971).
106. Id. § 218 cmt. c.
107. See Reese, supra note 12, at 698. Professor Larry Kramer states that the assumption
that the choice of an invalidating law was inadvertent is not always warranted either be-
cause the parties may not have intended to include the invalidated substantive provision or
because the part invalidated may be an oral modification. See Larry Kramer, Rethinking
Choice of Law, 90 COLUM. L. REv. 277, 332 (1990). This is not cogent because reformation
is available to correct drafting errors. See, e.g., Goode v. Riley, 28 N.E. 228, 229 (Mass.
1891) (refusing to rescind a transaction and modifying a property title because of mutual
mistake). Whether an oral modification should be enforced depends on whether one
party did not intend to be bound by the modification and whether this intention can be
imposed on the other party under proper standards of interpretation. See RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 201 (1979) (holding a contract enforceable against a party who
had reason to know the meaning attached by the first party). Even the Uniform Commer-
cial Code empowers the parties to exclude oral modifications, but enforces oral "waiver[s]"
that are relied upon. See U.C.C. § 2-209(2), (4), (5) (1994) (declaring that a party waiving
an executory portion of a contract may retract the waiver "unless the retraction would be
unjust in view of a material change of position in reliance on the waiver").
108. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAws § 187(2)(b) (1971).
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hold the obligation ineffective."1" 9 This argument confuses enforcing
the parties' agreement with imposing an "obligation" contrary to the
agreement.
2. Most Significant Relationship.--Section 188 states that the law
governing in the absence of party choice is that of the state with "the
most significant relationship to the transaction and the parties."110
Again, there are mixed signals, some suggesting that territorial con-
tacts are important in themselves and some emphasizing the impor-
tance of knowing content and purpose before choosing law. Section
188(2) provides a list of five territorial contacts "to be taken into ac-
count."'' The most unrepentantly territorial section is 188(3): "If
the place of negotiating the contract and the place of performance
are in the same state, the local law of this state will usually be applied,
except [for some specific kinds of contracts dealt with in subsequent
sections]."112
Professor Cavers criticized a 1960 draft of the Restatement (Sec-
ond)'s contracts provisions' 13 as "impaired by... 'jurisdiction-selecting
rules,' that is, rules which make a state the object of the choice without
regard to the content of the law that is thereby chosen or its effect on
the issue before the forum." 114 Perhaps this criticism resulted in the
insertion of the word "usually" in section 188(3);115 it was not in the
1960 draft." 6
Professor Cavers also noted:
Happily... Restatement Second uses, at a number of points,
concepts of such elasticity as to permit a forum following it
to select the jurisdiction to provide the governing law with a
view to the content of the competing laws actually involved
in that choice and the results they would work in the case
before it." 7
This same "elasticity" is found in the final product. There are again
cross references to section 611l with its focus on the content and pur-
109. Reese, supra note 12, at 698.
110. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAws § 188(1) (1971).
111. Id. § 188(2).
112. Id. § 188(3).
113. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS (Tentative Draft No. 6, 1960)
[hereinafter 1960 Draft].
114. Cavers, supra note 11, at 350 (footnote omitted).
115. See supra note 41.
116. See 1960 Draft, supra note 113, § 332b(a) (referring to "the place of contracting"
instead of "the place of negotiating the contract").
117. Cavers, supra note 11, at 350.
118. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAws § 188(1), (2) (1971).
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pose of law.119 After section 188(2) lists five contacts "to be taken into
account," it cautions that they "are to be evaluated according to their
relative importance with respect to the particular issue."1 20
In the absence of choice of law by the parties, a simple presump-
tion of validity would have been preferable to section 188's confused
mixture of territorial and policy-oriented directions.1 21 In the com-
ments to section 188, there is a brief reference to the importance of
validation, 122 and the Reporter's Note to section 188 cites as "a sug-
gested alternative formulation" a proposal to adopt a rule of valida-
tion. 123 Only in the section addressed to the issue of usury does the
Restatement (Second) use as its compass an express rule of validation. 124
II. PRECISE RuLEs
As Professor Reese predicted, the Restatement (Second) does state
"precise and definite rules" in areas that the restaters thought suffi-
ciently settled by established doctrine. 25 Such confidence in the face
of an ongoing conflicts revolution was remarkable and ultimately
proved to be foolhardy.
119. See supra note 38 and accompanying text.
120. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 188(2) (1971).
121. See Seubert Excavators, Inc. v. Anderson Logging Co., 889 P.2d 82, 85-86 (Idaho
1995) (applying § 188 and choosing Idaho law to validate an indemnity agreement be-
tween general contractor and subcontractor because "it defies logic to believe the parties
would include an indemnification provision which they did not intend to be fully binding
on them").
122. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 188 cmt. b (1971) (stating that the
parties' "expectations should not be disappointed by application of the local law rule of a
state which would strike down the contract or a provision thereof unless the value of pro-
tecting the expectations of the parties is substantially outweighed in the particular case by
the interest of the state with the invalidating rule").
123. Id. § 188 Reporter's Note at 586, citing Russell J. Weintraub, Choice of Law in Con-
tract, 54 IowA L. REv. 399 (1968). The "alternative formulation" referred to is as follows:
A contract is valid if valid under the domestic law of any state having a contact
with the parties or with the transaction sufficient to make that state's validating
policies relevant, unless some other state would advance its own policies by invali-
dating the contract and one or more [of five factors] suggest that the conflict
between the domestic laws of the two states should be resolved in favor of invalid-
ity ....
Weintraub, supra, at 430.
124. The Restatement (Second) section 203 provides:
The validity of a contract will be sustained against the charge of usury if it pro-
vides for a rate of interest that is permissible in a state to which the contract has a
substantial relationship and is not greatly in excess of the rate permitted by the
general usury law of the state of the otherwise applicable law under the rule of
§ 188.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAws § 203 (1971).
125. See supra note 13 and accompanying text.
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A. Procedure
Many of the Restatement (Second)'s "definite rules" are in the chap-
ter on "Procedure." 26 In the context of the conflict of laws, the pro-
cedural label is shorthand for "apply the law of the forum. 12 7 If the
same focus on content and policy that sparked the conflicts revolution
in other areas is applied to "procedure," a court will apply forum law
without full conflicts analysis only in limited circumstances. The occa-
sion for direct resort to the local rule in multistate cases will be one in
which the trouble of finding and applying a foreign rule is not justi-
fied because the rule is not likely to affect the choice of forum.
1 2 8
Below I discuss some of the Restatement Seconds "procedural" rules
that, under this standard, would have to be reclassified as
"substantive."
1. Statutes of Limitations.-Perhaps the most bizarre sections in
the Restatement (Second)'s Procedure chapter are sections 142129 and
143,130 dealing with statutes of limitations. Section 143 provides a lim-
ited exception to application of forum limitations when the foreign
statute "bars the right and not merely the remedy."13 ' A limitation
bars the right when the right is statutory and "the limitation provision
was directed to the right 'so specifically as to warrant saying that it
qualified the right."
1 3 2
Treating time limitations as procedural is undesirable because
they are too important and too likely to affect the choice of forum for
126. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS ch. 6 (1971).
127. Id. Introductory Note at 350 (stating that "the forum will apply its own local law to
matters of procedure").
128. See Walter Wheeler Cook, "Substance" and "Procedure" in the Conflict of Laws, 42 YALE
L.J. 333, 344 (1932).
129. Section 142 provides:
Statute of Limitations of Forum
(1) An action will not be maintained if it is barred by the statute of limitations of
the forum, including a provision borrowing the statute of limitations of another
state.
(2) An action will be maintained if it is not barred by the statute of limitations of
the forum, even though it would be barred by the statute of limitations of another
state, except as stated in § 143.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAws § 142 (1971).
130. Section 143 provides:
Foreign Statute of Limitations Barring the Right
An action will not be entertained in another state if it is barred in the state of the
otherwise applicable law by a statute of limitations which bars the fight and not
merely the remedy.
Id. § 143.
131. Id.
132. Id. § 143 cmt. c (quoting Davis v. Mills, 194 U.S. 451, 454 (1904)).
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a court to select them without full-scale, choice-of-law analysis. Deter-
mining and applying foreign limitations is no more difficult than de-
termining and applying any other foreign rule, such as one of tort or
contract, that is admittedly "substantive" for conflicts purposes.
The reasons that the choice-of-law analysis of statutes of limita-
tions should not be short-circuited by a "procedural" label was stated
in an opinion byJudge, laterJustice, Harlan, fourteen years before the
Restatement (Second) was promulgated. In Bournias v. Atlantic Maritime
Co.,1 33 Judge Harlan felt compelled by precedent to apply the com-
mon law rules later encapsulated in sections 142 and 143, but referred
sympathetically to adverse academic criticism of those rules.1"4 He be-
gan by noting the practical reasons for treating some issues as proce-
dural for conflicts purposes.135 Judge Harlan then noted that these
reasons for procedural treatment did not fit statutes of limitations,
stating that treatment of limitations as procedural "has been criticized
as inconsistent with the [reasons for a procedural classification] since
the foreign statute, unlike evidentiary and procedural details, is gener-
ally readily discovered and applied, and a difference in periods of limi-
tation would often be expected to influence the choice of forum. "136
In addition, before the Restatement (Second) was promulgated, dis-
satisfaction with the procedural treatment of limitations went beyond
academic criticism and dictum. Three courts had already insisted that
the new methods of conflicts analysis, which focused on the content
and purposes of laws, should be applied to selecting the appropriate
limitations period. 13 7  Only after more than twenty courts swam
against the Restatement (Second)'s current, applying the new conflicts
analysis to statutes of limitations, did the American Law Institute take
133. 220 F.2d 152 (2d Cir. 1955).
134. Id. at 156-57.
135. Id. at 154.
136. Id.
137. See Gianni v. Fort Wayne Air Serv., Inc., 342 F.2d 621, 621 (7th Cir. 1965) (holding
"that for the reasons stated in the Watts case, the Indiana statute of limitations should have
been applied" (citing Watts v. Pioneer Corn Co., 342 F.2d 617, 620 (7th Cir. 1965) (stating
that the law of the state that has "a more significant relationship" or a state's "sufficiently
substantial interest" in the action governs where there is a choice-of-law question))); Gore
v. Debaryshe, 278 F. Supp. 883, 884 (W.D. Ky. 1968) (stating that "the law of the state
where the injury occurred determines the rights of the parties unless some other state has
a more significant relationship with the occurrence and the parties as to the [statute of
limitations] issue"); Paris v. General Elec. Co., 282 N.Y.S.2d 348, 353 (App. Div. 1967)
(applying New York's longer statute of limitations over Massachusetts's, the location of the
injury, "in pursuance of the advances made with respect to State concern and center of
interest"), affjd mem., 290 N.Y.S.2d 1015 (App. Div. 1968).
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the unusual step of adopting a revision of sections 142 and 143 that
more closely reflected proper substantive treatment of the issue.' 38
I say "more closely" because the new section 142 gives far more
preference to forum law than any other Restatement (Second) rule apply-
ing the principles of section 6. When the forum's limitations period is
shorter than that of the other state with which the parties and the
occurrence are connected, section 142(1) applies forum law. One
problem with 142(1) is that it does not distinguish situations in which
the forum merely wishes to rid itself of what it considers an untimely
suit and has no objection to its being tried elsewhere, from cases in
which the forum wishes to protect the defendant by applying its limi-
tations to bar suit anywhere. Section 142(1) also does not take ac-
count of the possibility that the forum may consider the policies
underlying its shorter limitations insufficiently applicable to bar a suit
at the forum that is timely under another state's law.13 9
The new version of section 142(2) is even more troublesome be-
cause it is heavily weighted in favor of the forum's longer statute of
limitations, thus producing a decision on the merits. Any clash be-
tween forum and foreign interests is resolved in favor of the forum.
This approach contradicts what a comment to the new section says is
the burden of the many cases subjecting limitations to choice-of-law
analysis:
They stand for the proposition that an action will not be
maintained if it is barred by the statute of limitations of the
state which, with respect to the issue of limitations, is the
138. Sections 142 and 143 were revised and consolidated to become the new section
142:
Statute of Limitations
Whether a claim will be maintained against the defense of the statute of limi-
tations is determined under the principles stated in § 6. In general, unless the
exceptional circumstances of the case make such a result unreasonable:
(1) The forum will apply its own statute of limitations barring the claim.
(2) The forum will apply its own statute of limitations permitting the claim
unless:
(a) maintenance of the claim would serve no substantial interest of the
forum; and
(b) the claim would be barred under the statute of limitations of a state
having a more significant relationship to the parties and the occurrence.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAws Revisions § 142 (1988); see also id. Reporter's
Note at 131 (citing twenty-two cases).
139. See FDIC v. Nordbrock, 102 F.3d 335, 339 (8th Cir. 1996) (holding that Illinois's
longer statute of limitations applies although the forum's statute would bar the action
against the forum defendant); Ledesma v. Jack Stewart Produce, Inc., 816 F.2d 482, 486
(9th Cir. 1987) (permitting a California resident to sue Arizona and Oklahoma residents in
California when limitations had expired under California law but not under Arizona or
Oklahoma law).
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state of most significant relationship to the occurrence and
the parties under the principles stated in § 6.140
Thus, the Restatement (Second) did "prove to be a hindrance, rather
than an aid""' in applying policy-oriented analysis to statutes of limi-
tations, and the 1988 revision still has not gotten it right.
2. Quantification of Damages.-In discussing choice of law for
damages, it is helpful to distinguish between "heads" of damages and
standards for quantifying recovery under those heads. Heads of dam-
ages are the categories under which recovery is available to the plain-
tiff. Examples are lost wages, medical expenses, pain and suffering,
and punitive damages. On the other hand, standards for quantifying
recovery determine whether an award under these heads is reason-
able-for example, whether an award of $500,000 for pain and suffer-
ing is excessive.
The Restatement (Second) wisely treats heads of damages as substan-
tive and chooses the law applicable to them under the principles of
section 6.142 This reflects the long-established rule,'43 from which
courts have made only aberrant departures, usually to avoid a territo-
rial choice-of-law rule that they were about to abandon.1" The Restate-
ment (Second), however, treats quantification of damages as
procedural. 14 5 This too accords with the established rule.1 46 The es-
140. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS Revisions § 142 cmt. e (1988).
141. Reese, supra note 12, at 681.
142. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 178 (1971) (referring to § 175 for
determining damages for wrongful death); id. § 171 (referring to § 145 for determining
damages for other torts).
143. See Slater v. Mexican Nat'l R.R., 194 U.S. 120, 126 (1904) ("[W]e may lay on one
side as quite inadmissible the notion that the law of the place of the act may be resorted to
so far as to show that the act was a tort, and then may be abandoned, leaving the conse-
quences to be determined according to the accident of the place where the defendant may
happen to be caught.").
144. See, e.g., Kilberg v. Northeast Airlines, Inc., 172 N.E.2d 526, 529 (N.Y. 1961) (avoid-
ing limitation on damages under the law of the place of fatal injury by stating that damages
for wrongful death are "procedural or remedial" and also stating that the limitation vio-
lates the public policy of the forum state); see also Babcock v. Jackson, 191 N.E.2d 279, 285
(N.Y. 1963) (abandoning the place-of-wrong rule for torts where "its application may lead
to unjust and anomalous results").
145. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAws § 171 cmt. f (1971) ("The forum will
follow its own local practices in determining whether the damages awarded by a jury are
excessive.").
146. See 1 DIcEY & MORMS ON THE CONFLICT OF LAws 183 (Lawrence Collins et al. eds.,
12th ed. 1993) ("A distinction must be drawn between remoteness and heads of damage,
which are questions of substance governed by the lex causae, and measure or quantification
of damages, which is a question of procedure governed by the lex fori" (footnote
omitted)).
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tablished rule is monstrous. Quantification of damages is the bottom
line. Everything else is mere prologue. Allowing United States juries
to assess what they think are proper damages for injuries abroad, even
when foreign law otherwise applies, is the major reason why the
United States is a magnet forum for the afflicted of the world.
1 47
At long last a beam of sanity has pierced this darkness. In a con-
flict between federal circuits, some federal courts have held that Erie
Railroad Co. v. Tompkins1 48 requires evaluating jury verdicts under the
standards of the state whose law applies to heads of damages, 149 but
the Seventh Circuit has disagreed. 50 Now the United States Supreme
Court has resolved the controversy, holding that Erie requires federal
courts sitting in diversity to apply "the law that gives rise to the claim
for relief"15" when determining whether damages are excessive. This
rule is not binding on the states, 152 but it states clearly that quantifica-
tion of damages is too important to be treated as procedural for con-
flicts purposes. This may presage a salutary change of attitude in state
courts, but if reform occurs, it will be without assistance from the Re-
statement (Second).
147. See Piper Aircraft Co. v. Reyno, 454 U.S. 235, 252 n.18 (1981) (listing "jury trials" as
one of the reasons why United States courts are attractive to foreign plaintiffs); Smith Kline
& French Lab. Ltd. v. Bloch, [1983] 1 W.L.R. 730, 734 (C.A. 1982) (Lord Denning, M.R.)
(stating that United States juries "are prone to award fabulous damages").
148. 304 U.S. 64, 78 (1938) (holding that when state law is the source of the governing
rule, a federal court must apply the state common law rule and not create one of its own);
see also Klaxon Co. v. Stentor Elec. Mfg. Co., 313 U.S. 487, 496 (1941) (stating that the Erie
mandate includes state choice-of-law rules).
149. See Raucci v. Town of Rotterdam, 902 F.2d 1050, 1058-59 (2d Cir. 1990) (ordering a
new trial subject to remittitur of a wrongful death award in excess of the award amount
permitted in New York state courts); Martell v. Boardwalk Enters., Inc., 748 F.2d 740, 750
(2d Cir. 1984) ("In determining whether an award is so excessive as to shock the judicial
conscience, we look.., to other jury awards condoned by the courts of the state whose
substantive law governs the rights of the parties."); Hysell v. Iowa Pub. Serv. Co., 559 F.2d
468, 472 (8th Cir. 1977) ("Because this is a diversity case, we must take care that the dam-
age award does not exceed that which could be sustained were the case before the highest
court of the state whose substantive law gives rise to the claim.").
150. See Cash v. Beltmann N. Am. Co., 900 F.2d 109, 111 n.3 (7th Cir. 1990) (looking
not only to forum-state decisions, but also to decisions from other circuits on the proper
ratio between punitive damages and a defendant's net worth); In re Air Crash Disaster Near
Chicago, 803 F.2d 304, 318 n.12 (7th Cir. 1986) ("In the case of a tort damages award in a
routine diversity case, a federal court examining analogous awards is not necessarily lim-
ited to cases decided by the courts of the state whose law governs the diversity action.").
151. Gasperini v. Center for Humanities, Inc., 116 S. Ct. 2211, 2224-25 n.22 (1996).
152. A state's traditional procedural characterization of a conflicts issue, though argua-
bly wrong under modern choice-of-law analysis, is unlikely to be declared unconstitutional.
See, e.g., Sun Oil Co. v. Wortman, 486 U.S. 717, 729 (1988) (holding that Kansas may char-
acterize time limitations as procedural and permit recovery that would be time-barred in
the states whose laws apply to substantive issues).
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3. Privileged Communications. -The Restatement (Second) places
the subject of privileged communications in its Procedure chapter
and, in section 139,153 states a rule that is forum centered with regard
to exclusion and even more weighted in favor of applying the forum's
rule of admission. The Restatement (Second)'s rule permits the forum to
exclude evidence not privileged under the law of the state that has the
most significant relationship with the communication if admission
"would be contrary to the strong public policy of the forum."' 5 4 On
the other hand, the forum may admit evidence privileged under the
law of the state that has the most significant relationship with the com-
munication "unless there is some special reason why the forum policy
favoring admission should not be given effect."155
Invocation of the forum's public policy to exclude evidence even
when "the state of the forum has no relationship to the transaction ' 15 6
is likely to affect the outcome. If the forum would dismiss the case
without prejudice to suit elsewhere, use of public policy would be less
obnoxious than under section 139(1), which clearly contemplates pro-
ceeding with the suit.'
57
Even more undesirable is section 139(2), which, unless a "special
reason" to exclude exists, admits evidence under forum law that
would be excluded in the state of most significant relationship to the
communication. 15' Even the Federal Rules of Evidence defer to state
law on privileged communications.
159
153. Section 139 provides:
Privileged Communications
(1) Evidence that is not privileged under the local law of the state which has the
most significant relationship with the communication will be admitted, even
though it would be privileged under the local law of the forum, unless the admis-
sion of such evidence would be contrary to the strong public policy of the forum.
(2) Evidence that is privileged under the local law of the state which has the most
significant relationship with the communication but which is not privileged
under the local law of the forum will be admitted unless there is some special
reason why the forum policy favoring admission should not be given effect.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAws § 139 (1971). Section 139 was revised in
1988, but the rules quoted above were not changed. The only significant change was the
addition of a new comment concerning depositions. Id. Revisions § 139 cmt. f (1988).
154. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 139(1) (1971).
155. Id. § 139(2).
156. Id, § 139 cmt. c.
157. Id.
158. Id. § 139(2).
159. SeeFED. R. EVID. 510 ("[I]n civil actions ... with respect to an element of a claim or
defense as to which State law supplies the rule of decision, the privilege of a witness ...
shall be determined in accordance with State law.").
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Section 139 works best when a court, as in Ford Motor Co. v. Leg-
gat,160 applies its provisions selectively. In Leggat, a Texan was killed in
Texas when a Ford Bronco, which he had purchased in Texas, rolled
over.16 At issue was whether the court would admit the report of
Ford's principal in-house attorney to the company's Policy and Strat-
egy Committee. 16 2 The report was privileged under the law of Michi-
gan, where it was communicated at Ford's headquarters, but Texas
had a narrower corporate attorney-client privilege, under which it was
doubtful that the report could be privileged and therefore ex-
cluded.16 The court focused on the exception in section 139(2),
finding "special reasons why Texas should defer to the broader attor-
ney-client privilege of Michigan." 64
The court noted that the Restatement (Second) "identifies four fac-
tors to consider when determining admissibility: number and nature
of contacts of the forum with the parties or transaction, materiality of
the evidence, kind of privilege, and fairness to the parties." 6 ' Never-
theless, the court focused only on the kind of privilege, finding that
the attorney-client privilege, old and well-established, though, as this
case reveals, differing in scope from state to state, should be protected
"by the law of the state with the most significant relationship to the
communication.166
If the court had also focused on the other three factors in section
139 comment (d), it might have come to a different, and less desira-
ble, conclusion. The first factor, "the number and nature of the con-
tacts that the state of the forum has with the parties and with the
transaction involved," '67 points to admissibility under Texas law to fa-
cilitate recovery for Texas blood spilled on a Texas highway because
of an allegedly defective vehicle purchased in Texas. The second fac-
tor, "materiality of the evidence,"1 6 also points to admission. The
fourth factor, "fairness to the parties, '  gives mixed signals. Ford
may have relied on the broad Michigan form of the corporate attor-
160. 904 S.W.2d 643 (Tex. 1995).
161. Id. at 645. The case does not state that Leggat was a Texan or that the vehicle was
purchased in Texas. This information was supplied by counsel for plaintiff. Telephone
Interview with J. Hadley Edgar, Of Counsel, Law Offices of Frank L. Anson, P.C., Dallas,
Tex. (Sept. 20, 1996).
162. Leggat, 904 S.W.2d at 645.
163. Id. at 646.
164. Id. at 647.
165. Id. (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAws § 139 cmt. d (1971)).
166. Id,
167. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAws § 139 cmt. d (1971).
168. Id
169. Id.
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ney-client privilege,'17 but the privilege was asserted by a party, and
under the Restatement (Second), this weighs in favor of admissibility.' 71
The court chose the right law for determining admissibility of the
attorney-client communication, but would have had an easier time do-
ing so without an obligation to justify itself under the Restatement
(Second).
B. Substance: Realty
Among the Restatement (Second)'s "precise and definite"'172 sub-
stantive rules, none is more specific than those relating to real estate,
and nowhere in the Restatement (Second) is there a more confused mix-
ture of territorial rules and policy-oriented analysis. Almost every
choice-of-law issue affecting realty is referred to the law of the situs. 1
This is true despite the fact that commentators had demonstrated
before the Restatement (Second) was promulgated that the situs rule for
real estate is one of the most dysfunctional of all the territorial
rules, 174 and that the situs qua situs has no interest in having its law
applied unless the issue involves use of the land in a manner forbid-
den by the situs.
171
The restaters were obviously uneasy about the situs rule. The
comments mix nonsense with antidotes for the nonsense. We are told
that the law of the situs applies to determine the capacity to make a
conveyance even though the parties are domiciled elsewhere. 176 The
reason is that applying the law of the common domicile, which "[i] t
170. The Restatement (Second) states that "[t]he forum will be more inclined to give effect
to a privilege if it was probably relied upon by the parties." Id
171. See id (stating that if "the privilege belongs to a person who is not a party to the
action ... the forum will be more inclined to recognize the privilege and to exclude the
evidence than it would be in a situation where the privilege is claimed by a person who is a
party to the action").
172. See supra note 13 and accompanying text.
173. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAws § 223 (1971) (validity and
effect of conveyance); id. § 226 (transfer of an interest in land by operation of law); id.
§ 228 (interests created by a mortgage); id. § 234 (effect of marriage on interest in land
acquired during coverture); id. § 235 (existence and extent of equitable interests); id.
§ 236 (intestate succession); id. § 239 (validity and effect of a will); id. § 241 (interest of
surviving spouse). The reference in these sections is to "the law that would be applied by
the courts of the situs," but the statement immediately following notes that, "[t] hese courts
would usually apply their own local law in determining such questions." Id. §§ 223(2),
226(2), 228(2), 234(2), 235(2), 236(2), 239(2), 241(2).
174. See Moffatt Hancock, Equitable Conversion and the Land Taboo in Conflict of Laws, 17
STAN. L. REv. 1095, 1105 (1965).
175. See Russell J. Weintraub, An Inquiry into the Utility of "Situs" As a Concept in Conflicts
Analysis, 52 CORNELL L. Rv. 1, 11 (1966).
176. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFuCT OF LAws § 223 cmt. b (1971).
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could be argued ... has the dominant interest ... would complicate
the task of title searchers and of other persons concerned with [the]
land."' 77 Then, in the first illustration following this statement, we are
told that in a divorce proceeding the common domicile of husband
and wife should apply its own law, which is contrary to that of the situs,
and entitles a wife to an order requiring the husband to deed her his
interest in the land. 1 8 The illustration explains that "the [situs] re-
cording system would not be affected if the [divorce] court were to
apply [its own local law] .. .because the transfer would not be effec-
tive against third persons until the transfer ... had been recorded in
[the situs] in accordance with the [situs] requirements."' 79
Other examples of this Jekyll-and-Hyde approach abound in the
Restatement (Second) sections on real estate. Section 236 states that in-
testate succession will be determined by the whole law of the situs,
with the expectation that courts there will apply their own law.'
Then, in the only comment to this section, the silliness of this rule is
immediately revealed:
There may in the given case be other states which have an
even greater interest in this question, such as would probably
be true of a state where the decedent and all of his heirs
were domiciled....
If, under the practice of the situs, the persons who are
entitled to succeed upon intestacy to interests in local land
are conclusively determined as against all others by a court
decree in the administration proceedings or otherwise, there
is no reason so far as title searchers and other third persons
are concerned why intestate succession should not on occa-
sion follow the local law of another state. 18'
Section 242 applies the whole law of the situs, including its con-
flicts rules, to the rights of a surviving spouse to take against the will of
the deceased spouse, and again the expectation is that the law of the
situs will apply.18 2 Once more the comments cast doubt on the wis-
dom of the black letter law: "On the other hand, these [situs] courts
might apply the forced share rules of the state of the spouses' com-
mon domicil if it were [to] appear that the deceased spouse had
bought land in the situs in an attempt to avoid application of the rules
177. Id.
178. Id. cmt. i, illus. 1.
179. Id.
180. Id. § 236.
181. Id. § 236 cmt. a.
182. Id. § 242.
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of the common domicil."' 3 Even if situs courts did not have enough
sense to do this, one would hope that courts at the marital domicile
with personal jurisdiction over all interested parties18 4 would repudi-
ate section 242 and apply their own law to protect the surviving spouse
against disinheritance.
Since the publication of the Restatement (Second), a few courts have
applied a consequences-based analysis to conflicts involving realty,
and rejected situs law.'8 5 That the least functional of all the territorial
rules, situs of realty, remains predominant in the United States,18 6 is
due in large part to the stultifying influence of the Restatement (Second).
III. STRENGTHS
A. Escape from Territorial Rules
In one of his extremely useful annual surveys of choice-of-law
cases, Professor Symeonides observes that "[s]ome states use the Re-
statement Second solely as an escape from a traditional choice-of-law
rule. ' 187 Using the prestige of the American Law Institute and the
Restatement (Second) to justify basic change and guided by counsel who
understand how the content and purposes of a law affect its applica-
183. Id. § 242 cmt. c.
184. See id. § 55 (stating that a court may "order a person, who is subject to its judicial
jurisdiction, to do, or not to do, an act in the state, although the carrying out of the decree
may affect a thing in another state"); id. § 55 illus. 1 (stating that a court may order convey-
ance of land in another state).
185. See, e.g., Wendelken v. Superior Court, 671 P.2d 896, 898-901 (Ariz. 1983) (en
banc) (holding that the law of common domicile, not Mexican situs, should be applied to
determine compensation owed to an injured guest); Sarbacher v. McNamara, 564 A.2d
701, 707-08 (D.C. 1989) (applying law of D.C. domicile, not Florida situs, to determine
whether husband's estate is entitled to contribution from wife's estate toward payment of
mortgage); Rudow v. Fogel, 426 N.E.2d 155, 160-61 (Mass. App. Ct. 1981) (holding that
the law of New York domicile of parties rather than of Massachusetts situs should be ap-
plied to determine whether there is a constructive trust in realty); In re Estate of Janney,
446 A.2d 1265, 1266-67 (Pa. 1982) (applying law of testatrix's Pennsylvania domicile rather
than of NewJersey situs to validate will when chief devisee is an attesting witness); Dority v.
Dority, 645 P.2d 56, 59 (Utah 1982) (affirming a judgment that applied the law of hus-
band's domicile at time of divorce rather than situs law in determining wife's interest in
realty owned by the spouses as tenants by the entireties).
186. Many other legal systems do not refer to situs law when choosing the law applicable
to the estate of a deceased person, but instead apply the same law to succession of both
personal property and realty. Some of these countries apply the law of the decedent's
domicile and some the law of the decedent's nationality. See Georges A.L. Droz, Commen-
tary on the Questionnaire on Succession in Private International Law, in 2 PROCEEDINGS OF THE
SIXTEENTH SESSION OF THE HAGUE CONFERENCE ON PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAw 19-51
(1990); Hans Van Loon, Update of the Commentary on Succession in Private International Law, in
id. at 107-19.
187. Symeon C. Symeonides, Choice of Law in the American Courts in 1995: A Year in Re-
view, 44 AM.J. COMP. L. 181, 194 (1996).
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tion to multistate occurrences, these courts have produced models of
modem conflicts methodology. An example is the opinion of the
Supreme Court of Texas in Duncan v. Cessna Aircraft Co.' 88 A Texan
taking flying lessons was killed by an airplane crash in New Mexico.189
His widow brought suit in federal court in Texas against the estate of
the instructor pilot and the pilot's employer. 9 ' The instructor was
domiciled in New Mexico, and his employer was a New Mexico corpo-
ration.' The widow settled her suit and executed a release of the
employer, the estate of the instructor, and "'any other corporations or
persons.""9 " The student's widow then sued Cessna, the aircraft's
manufacturer, claiming that design and manufacturing defects caused
the crash to be fatal. 9 Cessna pleaded the release as a defense.' 9 4
Under New Mexico law, the general wording, "any other corpora-
tions," was sufficient to release Cessna,'9 5 but under Texas law it was
not. 96 The court held that Texas law applied and that Cessna was not
released from liability to the widow.' 9 7
To reach this result, the court used the general framework of the
Restatement (Second), but molded the Restatement (Second) to produce a
form of interest analysis. The court noted that, before engaging in
choice-of-law analysis, "we must first determine whether there is a dif-
ference between the rules of Texas and New Mexico on [the release]
issue." '98 After determining that the laws of the two states did con-
flict, the court stated that it would choose the applicable law by "use of
the most significant relationship approach in accordance with the
general principles stated in § 6."199 This focus on section 6 gave pre-
cedence to the substantive policies underlying the conflicting laws."00
The court then listed the contacts of the parties and the transac-
tions with New Mexico, Texas, and Kansas, where Cessna was incorpo-
rated and the airplane was designed and manufactured.0 1 The court
then stated that "[t] he beginning point for evaluating these contacts is
188. 665 S.W.2d 414 (Tex. 1984).
189. Id. at 418.
190. Id.
191. Id. at 421.
192. Id. at 418 (emphasis omitted).
193. Id.
194. Id.
195. Id. at 420.
196. Id. at 419-20.
197. Id.
198. Id. at 419.
199. Id. at 421.
200. See supra note 38 and accompanying text.
201. Duncan, 665 S.W.2d at 421.
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the identification of the policies or 'governmental interests,' if any, of
each state in the application of its rule."2" 2 The court concluded that
this was a "'false conflict"'2 °3 because only Texas policies underlying
its release rule would be affected by the choice of law.204 En route,
the court stated that it "decline [d] to adopt 20 5 section 170(1) of the
Restatement (Second), under which the law governing tort issues "deter-
mines the effect of a release ... given to one joint tortfeasor upon the
liability of the others."20 6 The court pointed out that Cessna was not a
party to the release and that determining the effect of the release on
Cessna's liability implicated contract issues not adequately dealt with
by automatically applying the law that would apply to tortious liability
of the parties. 20
7
Thus, the court set out a four-step model for choosing law: (1) if
one of the parties requests displacement of forum law, determine the
content of the law of the other state and the content of forum law;
208
(2) if the two would produce different results when applied to the
facts before the court, determine the purposes underlying the laws of
each state;20 9 (3) determine whether, if each state's law is not applied,
the contacts of the parties or the occurrence with that state would
produce consequences there that its law is designed to prevent;210 and
(4) if only one state has contacts that trigger the policies underlying
its law, apply the law of that state.21 '
The court's form of analysis was admirable, although one might
quarrel with its implementation. The court found that "no New Mex-
ico defendant or injured party is involved" and, therefore, "New Mex-
ico has no governmental interest" in whether Cessna is discharged.21 2
This overlooks the fact that Cessna counterclaimed against the estate
of the New Mexico instructor pilot.213 New Mexico might well have a
policy of discharging all tortfeasors, whether specifically named in the
release or not, in order to prevent just this sort of occurrence-re-
202. Id. The court did not consider Kansas's interests because "Cessna has not asserted
any error in the trial court's application of New Mexico law." Id. at 422 n.6.
203. Id. at 422.
204. Id.
205. Id. at 420 n.4.
206. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAws § 170(1) (1971).
207. Duncan, 665 S.W.2d at 420 n.4.
208. Id. at 419-20.
209. Id. at 420-21.
210. Id. at 421-22.
211. Id. at 422.
212. Id. at 421.
213. Id at 418.
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leased defendants hauled back into court for contribution and indem-
nity when the plaintiff sues others.
The court did better in appraising Texas's interests. The opinion
noted that one purpose underlying the Texas rule that tortfeasors not
specifically named in a release are not discharged is "to ensure that
Texas claimants do not inadvertently lose their valuable rights against
unnamed and perhaps unknown tortfeasors. 214 The facts of this
case-separate and distinct claims against one whose conduct caused
the crash and the manufacturer whose negligence aggravated the inju-
ries-are exactly the ones that would trigger this policy.
Even more cogently, the court noted that the release was negoti-
ated and executed in Texas to settle a Texas suit.215 The lawyers and
their clients would be expected to look to Texas law to determine the
effect of the release. 21 6 Texas had "an interest in protecting [the
plaintiff's] reasonable contractual expectations." 217
Thus, the court shaped the Restatement (Second) to fit a content
and policy-oriented analysis of choice-of-law problems and rejected a
specific Restatement (Second) rule that it found inconsistent with that
form of analysis. In a survey of state conflicts methods, Texas may be
listed in the Restatement (Second) column, but as Professor Symeonides
points out, this is a far-from-satisfactory description of what Texas and
other states so listed are actually doing.2
18
B. Functional Insights
The Restatement (Second) contains many valuable insights into the
implications of a choice-of-law regime that focuses on the content and
purposes of laws rather than blindly sticking pins in maps. Perhaps
the most amazing is section 8, dealing with when a court should take
account of the choice-of-law rules of another jurisdiction.219 This
214. Id. at 422.
215. Id.
216. Id.
217. Id.
218. See Symeonides, supra note 187, at 194-95 (describing the various levels of commit-
ment states have in their use of the Restatement (Second)).
219. Section 8 provides:
Applicability of Choice-of-Law Rules of Another State (Renvoi)
(1) When directed by its own choice-of-law rule to apply "the law" of another
state, the forum applies the local law of the other state, except as stated in Subsec-
tions (2) and (3).
(2) When the objective of the particular choice-of-law rule is that the forum reach
the same result on the very facts involved as would the courts of another state, the
forum will apply the choice-of-law rules of the other state, subject to considera-
tions of practicability and feasibility.
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problem, often referred to as renvoi, was, in the context of territorial
conflicts rules, a framework for intellectual games. There was the fas-
cinating prospect of two jurisdictions with conflicts rules pointing to
one another. If each referred to the "whole law" of the state selected
by its own rule, it might find itself going around forever. Each rule
would be a mirror pointing at the other.2 2 °
One of the challenges of changing from a territorial conflicts re-
gime is determining the effect the change will have on the relevance
and treatment of renvoi. Section 8 meets the challenge in exemplary
fashion. Its black letter and comments identify three situations in
which a court applying the new methodology should refer to another
state's conflicts rules.
The circumstance of most practical importance is found in com-
ment (k): "An indication of the existence of a state interest in a given
matter, and of the intensity of that interest, can sometimes be ob-
tained from an examination of that state's choice-of-law decisions."221
This will be particularly true if that other state is also engaged in a
method of choosing law that focuses on state interests. 22 2 For exam-
ple, a resident of Texas borrows money from a New York lender and
agrees to pay interest that is legal under New York law but usurious
under Texas law. A New York court deciding the case preliminarily
finds a "true conflict" because both states are "interested" in having
their own laws applied: New York to give effect to the lender's bar-
gain, and Texas to protect the borrower. The court discovers a Texas
case that applied the foreign rule in favor of the lender and stated
that Texas did not want to discourage commercial loans to Texas busi-
nesses. 223 The New York court can apply its own law to enforce the
(3) When the state of the forum has no substantial relationship to the particular
issue or the parties and the courts of all interested states would concur in select-
ing the local law rule applicable to this issue, the forum will usually apply this
rule.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAws § 8 (1971).
220. See In reAnnesley, 135 L.T.R. 508 (Ch. 1926), in which the English forum's choice-
of-law rule pointed to France, and the French rule, as interpreted by the English court,
pointed to England. Id. at 513. The court broke the circle by deciding the case just as
would a French court; the court found that a French court would accept the reference
back to its own law, and applied French law to invalidate a will. Id.
221. RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF CONFLICT OF LAws § 8 cmt. k (1971).
222. See Pfau v. Trent Aluminum Co., 263 A.2d 129, 137 (N.J. 1970) (refusing to apply
the law of the place of wrong chosen by Connecticut's conflicts rule because "[lhex loci delicti
was born in an effort to achieve simplicity and uniformity, and does not relate to a state's
interest in having its law applied to given issues in a tort case").
223. Cf Woods-Tucker Leasing Corp. v. Hutcheson-Ingram Dev. Co., 642 F.2d 744, 750
(5th Cir. Apr. 1981) (enforcing a clause choosing Mississippi law, which provides lesser
penalties for usury than Texas law, and stating that parties to interstate commercial loan
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promises to the New York lender, confident that it has reached the
result that best accommodates the interests of both states.22 4
A second situation identified by section 8 in which the forum
should apply the choice-of-law rules of another state is "[w]hen the
objective ... is that the forum reach the same result on the very facts
involved as would the courts of another state."225 Although not men-
tioned in the comments2 2 6 the best example is the "eight-hundred-
pound gorilla" situation. The other jurisdiction has ultimate control
over the result and will not recognize a contrary adjudication at the
forum. This might occur when the dispute concerns interests in realty
situated in a foreign country that will not recognize a United States
court's in personam adjudication of the parties' rights. 227
The third situation in which section 8 counsels reference to an-
other state's choice-of-law rules is when "the forum has no substantial
relationship to the particular issue or the parties and the courts of all
interested states would concur in selecting the local law rule applica-
ble to this issue."228 This circumstance will not occur frequently, but
when it does,229 the Restatement (Second)'s position is eminently
sensible.
There are further valuable functional insights scattered through-
out the Restatement (Second). Perhaps the most important is that when
"a question ... would be decided the same way by the relevant local
transactions should be able "to stipulate for the higher of the two applicable rates of
interest").
224. But see Bushkin Assocs. v. Raytheon Co., 473 N.E.2d 662, 667 (Mass. 1985) (permit-
ting New York finder to recover against a Massachusetts client under Massachusetts law
even though a New York court would apply the New York statute of frauds and deny
recovery).
225. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAws § 8(2) (1971).
226. Comment (h) provides two examples. The first is when "the other state clearly has
the dominant interest in the issue to be decided and its interest would be furthered by
having the issue decided in the way that its courts would have done." Id. § 8 cmt. h. Then
cited is section 223, which relates "to the validity and effect of a transfer of interests in
land." Id. This is nonsense. See supra Part II.B. The second example is "where there is an
urgent need that all states should apply a single law in resolving a certain question." RE-
STATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAws § 8 cmt. h (1971). The example provides that
"the forum will apply the choice-of-law rules of the state of the decedent's domicil at death
to determine questions relating to succession to interests in movables." Id.
227. Cf In re Schneider's Estate, 96 N.Y.S.2d 652, 657 (Sur. Ct. 1950) (referring to the
Swiss choice-of-law rule to validate the testamentary disposition of Swiss realty).
228. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAws § 8(3) (1971).
229. See In re Zietz's Estate, 96 N.Y.S.2d 442, 446 (Sur. Ct. 1950) (applying the law of a
foreign decedent's nationality at death rather than his domicile to determine which ad-
ministrator should control ancillary administration in New York; although New York's
choice-of-law rule pointed to the domicile, both domicile and nationality agreed that na-
tionality should govern).
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law rules of all the potentially interested states... there is no need for
the forum to determine the state of the applicable law."23° Perhaps a
better way to state this is that, if the forum is one of these interested
states, there is no basis for displacing forum law and a choice-of-law
analysis is unnecessary. Many pages of case reports could be saved if
courts would learn this common-sense lesson.23'
CONCLUSION
A restatement, as indicated by the very name, is an inappropriate
vehicle for law reform. When the law in a particular subject is stable
and the results it is producing have triggered no cogent condemna-
tion, a restatement can be a useful guide for the profession. When,
on the contrary, courts and commentators are in the process of re-
analyzing a subject, a restatement is a bad idea. Nevertheless, the Re-
statement (Second) of Conflict of Laws23 2 persisted in its royal procession
despite the threats of peasants with pitchforks. That the project did
not set its face against the emerging changes and seek throughout to
maintain the untenable is due in large part to the intelligence and
industry of its Reporter. Professor Reese, after all, was one of the
scholars pointing the way to reforming the subject.2 33
The Restatement (Second) is an odd mixture of territorial gibberish
and functional analysis. Courts, with their overloaded dockets, cannot
be expected on their own to distinguish between the two. Counsel
have the duty to help the courts use the Restatement (Second) in a man-
ner that facilitates rather than impedes a content and policy-based
choice between conflicting laws. In turn, law schools have the obliga-
tion to prepare their students to assume this duty.
230. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 187 cmt. c (1971).
231. But see, e.g., Samuelson v. Susen, 576 F.2d 546, 551 (3d Cir. 1978) (stating that the
court will "look to Pennsylvania's conflict-of-laws rules to determine whether Ohio's or
Pennsylvania's [testimonial] privilege law applies.., even though, it might be argued that
the law, of the two jurisdictions, controlling the resolution of the privilege question is es-
sentially the same").
232. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLIcr OF LAws (1971).
233. See generally Elliott E. Cheatham & Willis L.M. Reese, Choice of the Applicable Law, 52
COLUM. L. REv. 959, 961 (1952) (setting forth "the major policies underlying choice of
law").
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